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Although religious freedom has the distinction as the “first
freedom,” it is not first in terms of protected rights. Religious
freedom is under attack and if not shielded from potential threats,
this quintessential American right may be lost altogether. Or at
least, this is what U.S. law professors Andrew Koppelman and
Steven D. Smith would have one believe, according to books each
professor recently published.
Unfortunately, they are not
exaggerating. Volumes of articles and tomes have been written
questioning, critiquing and criticizing (and lamenting, blasting and
ridiculing) the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicating the
religion clauses of the First Amendment, in general, and the
Establishment Clause, in particular. The Court’s jurisprudence in
this regard has been called everything from “unprincipled” to “a
disaster” to “an unholy mess.” 1 The frustration with the Court in
this area is not limited to the legal academy. It has spilled over into
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public discourse as well, with discussions in social media and oped pieces nationwide, by experts, journalists, and the average citizen
alike.
The most recent chapter in a long history of jurisprudential
incoherence occurred last year when the Court decided the Town of
Greece v. Galloway 2 case. In holding that prayer conducted as part
of legislative sessions at any level of government was
constitutionally permissible under the Establishment Clause, the
Court issued five different opinions, advancing seven different
theories in support of or against the decision. No theory received
clear consensus. The town may have won the case, but many
wondered if all Americans lost in the long run because of such a
divisive decision by the Court. One of the central premises of the
rule of law that shapes American society is stability and
predictability. Many questioned whether the Court was eroding the
rule of law—not by the decision it made, but by the multitude of
theories it advanced for that decision.
The problem of instability and unpredictability may seem
interesting from an intellectual standpoint—one that is fun to debate
with colleagues and friends in a casual setting or in the comment
section of a blog—but not a problem affecting the daily life of
Americans. This is a short-sighted perspective, however. The
inability for the Court to advance a coherent approach to the religion
clauses leaves many areas of American society vulnerable to attack.
For instance, the ability of religious organizations to govern their
internal affairs without government interference, the ability of
religious people to advance their religion openly through the
enactment of laws, and the ability of religious people to practice
their religion by not providing the services associated with samesex marriage are all areas affected by the Court’s decision-making
with respect to the religion clauses.
Given the importance of Supreme Court decisions over
Americans’ daily lives, it is time for the Court to develop a
consistent approach to Establishment Clause issues. Professors
Koppelman and Smith each argue for a particular approach to
address this quagmire. Each approach has merits. However, Smith
offers the better argument as his theory provides a path forward for
the Supreme Court using a method of adjudication the Court
practiced prior to the mid-twentieth century. Koppelman’s theory
2. 572 U.S. __ , 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014).
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has good substantive points and is attractive in terms of public
discourse and law-making; however, it is premised on a somewhat
flawed understanding of American history and is not developed
enough to have practical importance.
According to Koppelman, religion is good (or, alternatively, a
distinctive human good) and is therefore worthy of protection.
American law has always offered protection to religion, according
to Koppelman, by using the principle of neutrality. This good is
under attack by “religious traditionalists” who believe neutrality is
a fraud because the law necessarily involves substantive
commitments, for every action has a normative component. The
law does not go far enough in allowing religion in the public square.
At the other end of the spectrum are “radical secularists” who view
neutrality as flawed because it does not totally eradicate religion
from the public square. Koppelman believes that both camps have
an incomplete understanding of the character of neutrality, and once
properly understood, they will both see the merits of neutrality and
adopt it accordingly. The essence of neutrality, says Koppelman, is
the inability of government to declare religious truth, which is to
take a position on a live religious debate. The government may not
declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one or enact
laws that clearly imply such a declaration. According to
Koppelman, government can treat religion (defined at a high
enough abstraction) as a good thing without deciding any issue of
religious truth. The government should adopt this neutrality
because it has the following advantages: 1) reduces civil strife
caused by religious debate; 2) protects religion from corruption by
government manipulation; 3) ensures that religious minorities are
not oppressed; and 4) removes the government from an area of lawmaking in which it has no competence. The advantage of neutrality
is its fluidity. It looks different depending on a particular time and
circumstance. For this reason, neutrality in early America took the
form of a generic Protestantism. Now, given the change in
demographics and the rise of religious plurality, neutrality includes
a broad definition of religion, one that can include a nonsectarian
morality not based on “religion.”
Koppleman notes the neutrality doctrine in Supreme Court
cases, beginning with the pivotal Everson v. Board of Education 3
case of 1947, declaring the principle that the Establishment Clause
3. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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is applicable to the states and not just the federal government (the
incorporation principle), and the prohibition of government
monetary aid in support of religion. In tracing the development of
neutrality in American case law, he notes the development of the
secular purpose test, where the Court considers whether a law on its
face and as applied has a secular purpose, and not just a religious
one. He supports this test because it maintains true neutrality–it
ensures government is not declaring a religious truth. Removing
this test would leave people vulnerable to violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as historically many laws were enacted on
religious grounds.
Supreme Court jurisprudence is in disarray, according to
Koppelman, because some scholars and justices want to abandon
neutrality (and by extension the secular purpose test) and instead
adopt an approach where the government accepts and promotes
religion (usually in a monotheistic form). This group adopts the
traditionalists’ belief that the state needs religion to provide real
goods and moral resources, and therefore the government must rely
upon and promote a contestable set of ideals, making neutrality
impossible. This approach to reject neutrality and permit states to
favor monotheistic religion over its rivals (an approach attributed to
Justice Antonin Scalia) is, for Koppelman, a return to older, more
primitive tendencies in American law and not a good development.
He believes neutrality is the path forward. There is no need to go
back.
Professor Smith’s thesis centers on neutrality as well, but with
a different meaning and outcome. Smith defines the essence of
religious freedom as the freedom of the church and freedom of
conscience (the “inner church”). He traces the American story
surrounding these freedoms not to the venerated founders but to
Christianity’s early history during pagan Rome and its continued
ascension in medieval Europe. He notes that the Enlightenment
period did not define these concepts, as customarily believed, but
was instead a conduit for Christianity in that it embraced the spirit
of tolerance found in paganism, which in turn protected both the
freedom of the church and conscience. This continued onto the
American shores, where the founders instituted the Bill of Rights—
not as a transformative expression of new rights, but as an attempt
to maintain the status quo. The new national government would not
enact laws affecting religion, preferring instead to leave such
matters at the state level. The national government was thought to
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lack jurisdiction over matters of religion and so the Bill of Rights
made explicit what was already understood. Over time, as
consensus built in support of the separation of church and state (due
to the increase in religious pluralism), the First Amendment was
seen to enshrine the idea of disestablishment of religion from the
government. In this manner, the amendment transitioned from a
statement on the jurisdiction of the national government to an
affirmative commitment of the government to maintain a separation
of church and state.
The golden age of religious liberty according to Smith was the
time before Everson was decided when there was an “open
contestation” between “providentialists,” who believe government
should support one religion (Christianity) and allow others to grow,
and “secularists,” who believe the government should remain
detached and neutral towards religion.
During this open
contestation, government did not take a position between the two
sides. Instead, the disagreements between the two sides were
preserved and protected with both sides being constitutionally
legitimate. Smith calls this period the “American settlement.”
Cases were decided upon the set of understandings defining the
country at a particular moment, called soft constitutional law.
Under this regime, constitutional questions can be argued and
different states and localities reach their own conclusions.
Government does not take a position. Smith likens it to the
marketplace of ideas in freedom of speech doctrine and the twoparty system in politics. Each side is allowed to persuade citizens
to adopt a particular perspective and law, which will usually result
in cooperation between the two sides producing compromise. The
nature of the Constitution itself enshrines this ideal. According to
Smith, it is neither providentialist nor secularist, theist nor atheist.
This preserves unity amid diversity.
The American settlement is preferable to hard constitutional
law where the Supreme Court adjudicates cases based on supporting
one of the positions. This is exactly what happened beginning in
Everson and continuing into the twenty-first century. The Supreme
Court adopted secular neutrality, supporting the secularists, and
refined the doctrine throughout the decades by adopting and
revising various tests to apply to cases. Smith notes that although
the Court has used a variety of principles for religious clause cases,
neutrality was the predominant one.
Smith’s problem with this approach lies in the nature of
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neutrality and the outcome of using it. Genuine neutrality is
impossible. It rests on a spurious promise, an illusion. According
to Smith, it exists relative to a baseline but the baseline can never
truly be neutral. Speaking and acting says something–it stakes a
claim. Bias is inevitable. Further, the neutrality doctrine has
created a divisive dynamic. The secularists have been declared
constitutionally valid while the providentialists are declared
constitutional heretics. They can both feel like outsiders, leading to
alienation: the providentialists because they are no longer able to
speak in religious language and must adopt the secular dialect
(which can be superficial and weak) and the secularists because they
will feel betrayed by a de facto establishment of religion since all
traces of religion have not been, and will not be, removed from the
public square (e.g. religious language allowed in the motto, pledge,
and currency.).
For Smith, there is cause for concern. Besides the pressure to
adopt secular neutrality, the ideal of equality threatens to dismantle
religious freedom all together. Because of various cultural forces,
equality is pitted against religious freedom. The insistence that all
are free and worthy of equal rights has translated into denying
religion and religious people any special consideration. At a
fundamental level, the traditional religionist is incompatible with
the egalitarian because they are built on differing orthodoxies.
But Smith also has cause for hope. Because of the Supreme
Court’s erratic enforcement of the First Amendment, no side is
losing all of the time. Following this logic, it would seem that if
both sides have cause for complaint, then no group is truly
ascendant. Smith notes that the future of religious liberty depends
upon the fortunes of the church: if it remains a vital part of society,
religious freedom will continue. If, however, it succumbs to the
forces of secularity and equality, it will collapse.
There are a few areas of overlap between Koppelman and
Smith. The first is methodology and the second is substantive. As
to methodology, both use the same analytical approach in advancing
their theories. Each starts with a claim or story and, in true law
professor style, presents an argument against such claim. For
Koppelman, it is the claim that neutrality is incoherent and produces
bad results. Instead, he writes to defend neutrality. For Smith, it is
the standard story of American religious freedom, created by myth
and half-truths. Smith wants to present an accurate picture of
American religious freedom, and that includes acknowledging the
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ebb and flow of the salience of certain principles. Each presents
their response as one-half of a dialogue–a conversation in which the
audience (the reader) may or may not have prior knowledge. Also,
the authors are true professors in that they engage with the other’s
works (current and prior). Koppelman notes Smith’s view that
neutrality by its nature is biased as the government expressly or
tacitly either supports or denies religious belief. 4 Smith notes
Koppelman’s defense of neutrality and counters that, even with the
fluidity of neutrality, there will still be bias in the baseline chosen. 5
He claims that with neutrality, Koppelman is not providing a
principle but instead a label to put on specific conclusions reached
on other grounds (he even goes so far as to imply Koppelman would
agree with him). 6 Finally, both analyze prior Supreme Court cases
(albeit different ones) to support the conclusion that the Court has
adopted the neutrality approach. 7 They part ways on whether this
is a good development and whether it should be maintained.
As for substance, both confirm the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause–the prohibition on government to establish a
national church. It is interesting that they both use the same work
by Donald Drakeman to support this conclusion. 8 What is even
more interesting, however, is Smith’s (friendly) amendment to
Drakeman’s proposition. 9 Smith notes that the prohibition was not
just on establishing a religion, but also on anything that respects
religion, so that it covers collecting taxes from the public to support
the church, the licensing of ministers, and the like. It went beyond
building a national church. 10 Further, both professors base their
theories on conflict between two groups, and the nature of these
groups is the same for each author—those who would allow and
protect monotheism in law while tolerating other religions
(providentialists/traditionalists) and those who would remove
religion from law and the public square (secularists). They both
4. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
92 (2013).
5. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM 135-36 (2014).
6. Id.
7. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 84-90; SMITH, supra note 5, at 113-20.
8. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 82-84; SMITH, supra note 5, at 57-58 (both
referencing DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT
(2010)).
9. SMITH, supra note 5, at 59-60.
10. Id.
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note that each group has roots since the American founding and can
support their claims through historical documents. It is not
surprising that they both identify these groups, given the existence
of the culture wars and the polarizing nature of politics and public
discourse currently roiling through the country. It is helpful,
however, to have both professors acknowledge this division and
provide support that these divisions have existed for decades. Here,
again, they use the same source to evidence a part of their theory—
they both refer to Justice Scalia’s “atavistic” approach as
representative of the providentialist/traditionalist perspective. 11
The key difference between the two authors is their vision for
the role of the Supreme Court. One views the Court as referee in a
boxing match between two, and equally valid, conceptions of
constitutional law, while the other views the Court as a coach for
one of the boxers. In the open contestation between providentialists
and secularists, Smith is ambivalent as to which side should win.
His theory suggests that each will fight with the tools available in a
democracy (speech, association, political discourse, and the like)
and either there will be a compromise (draw) or one will dominate
(a knock-out). The Court is the referee ensuring the fight is
conducted fairly and abides by the proper rules. Koppelman, on the
other hand, sides with the secularists. While he is not as radical in
insisting upon the total removal of religion from public and for
denying any special consideration to religion (he advocates a
balancing approach when dealing with accommodations), 12 he
believes that religious justification for any law or policy is not
acceptable. In this way, he advocates for the Court to side with the
secularists and counsel them on their approach to neutrality by
maintaining the secular purpose test in order to best their
opponent—the traditionalist viewpoint.
The practical effect of both approaches is alienation.
Koppelman does not seem to be as concerned about this effect as
Smith. Koppelman says that alienation, or one not getting what they
want, is part of the political process. There will always be winners
and losers. It is not clear why law should be more concerned with
religious losers than other political losers. Smith, however, sees
alienation as the possible death knell to religious freedom and
results when the Court no longer plays the referee. Once the
11. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 39-42; SMITH, supra note 6, at 91.
12. KOPPELMAN, supra note 4, at 11-12.
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government chooses neutrality, religious adherents are no longer
able to be full participants in the public discourse and law-making,
and religion will no longer be given special consideration. Were
this to happen, the vitality of religion (and the power of the church)
will begin to wane leading to the evaporation of religious freedom.
Koppelman is concerned with protecting the abstract good of
religion by prohibiting government speaking on religious truth,
while Smith is concerned with the practical effect on religious
people and institutions.
When considering a path forward, Smith has the better
argument. First, his theory is supported by a more credible reading
of American history. Using historical documents, along with the
expertise of historians and scholars, he aptly demonstrates that the
drafting of the First Amendment was not a momentous movement,
but a retrieval of themes posited by pagans during medieval times.
Smith is methodical in his approach, which makes him credible and
his theory attractive. Koppelman’s analysis of history is not as
clear. He makes sweeping statements that are unsupported by facts
and then provides a more balanced, nuanced discussion. For
instance, he states that the framers believed religion corrupted
government. 13 To be sure, this is partially true—some framers did
believe this. But there were a host of others who did not. Further,
even some of those that believed this still supported government
expression of religion. Koppelman also states neutrality has always
been part of American history, but then notes the ways the law was
not entirely neutral in early America. 14 He also states that everyone
supports giving accommodations to religious believers 15 (surely
this is not true as demonstrated by the number of lawsuits on this
issue), and then provides a detailed discussion of the different
considerations and arguments surrounding accommodations.16
Most people agree that the history of America at its founding and
the subsequent development of constitutional principles is
complicated and nuanced.. Koppelman’s broader statements miss
this nuance and accordingly reduce his persuasive credibility.
Furthermore, Smith’s theory is attractive because he avoids
making any normative claim on religion or the role of religion in
society. The idea of religion is controversial and contestable in
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 26-42.
Id. at 11, 107.
Id. at 98-117.
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modern society. Smith shows that one need not wade into the
waters of this age-old conflict in order to adopt a coherent theory on
religious liberty. In fact, Koppelman exemplifies the problems that
occur when making claims about the nature of religion. One of the
major problems with Koppelman’s work is the shifting description
of religion. At times he says religion is “good.” 17 Other times, he
says religion is a “distinctive human good.” 18 These are two very
different concepts. The idea that religion is good is contestable and
has been for some time. A theory based on this premise will
automatically be unsatisfactory for those who do not believe
religion is good, or worse, believe that religion is a societal evil. In
this case, there is no need to protect or preserve something that is
detrimental for society. On the other hand, even those who are not
religious or believe that religion is not good, can accept religion as
a good–one method for humans to use to achieve the good life.
Some may not want religion in the public square, but would not
want to prohibit their fellow citizen from practicing religion in
private or in limited circumstances. They might be persuaded to
believe in the benefits of neutrality to protect religion. The
inconsistent use of religion as good/a good further confuses
Koppelman’s theory and weakens his central thesis.
Because Smith’s work leans more toward the descriptive side
and is less normative, his argument that the Court should return to
the time when government had no jurisdiction over religious matter
is persuasive. He notes that it is a stronger claim to say government
has no jurisdiction over religious matter, rather than say government
ought to do or ought not to do a certain action. Again, Koppelman
is a useful foil. Of the four reasons Koppelman gives for supporting
neutrality, three are normative—government ought to protect the
good of religion from corruption; government ought to protect the
civil peace; and government ought to protect religious minorities.
If one disagrees with these central premises (and there is plenty of
reasonable disagreement), then his theory becomes less persuasive.
Further, it is not clear why government ought to do these things and
not others. The fourth reason is the same as Smith’s jurisdiction
argument. Government lacks the competence to decide matters of
religion and law. The Court should remove religious issues
completely from government’s purview and let the people decide
17. Id. at 2, 20, 49, 107, 120.
18. Id. at 11, 15, and generally, ch. 4.
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for themselves.
The final reason Smith’s arguments are more persuasive is less
substantive and more stylistic. Smith’s prose is easily accessible by
any reader, constitutional scholar or average person. His style is
conversational, open and friendly. He presents each side and
supports the best argument with a balanced approach. He
acknowledges that he is oversimplifying complicated and complex
concepts. This is extremely beneficial, however. Since the reader
is joining a conversation each author is having within a larger
community, the most persuasive argument will be the one that is
comprehensible to the reader without prior knowledge. This cannot
be said about Koppelman’s work. Admittedly, Koppelman offers
his work as part of a discussion among legal theorists and political
philosophers. This requires a level of sophistication on the part of
the reader, perhaps limiting its accessibility for many.
Both authors published their book prior to the Court’s decision
in Town of Greece. Ironically, the Court’s decision demonstrates
each theory well. The majority opinion noted that the context and
jurisprudence of the First Amendment shows that the Establishment
Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer. Such prayer
created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion’s
role in society. The Court also distinguished between offense and
coercion. 19 The concurring opinion noted the long history of
legislative prayer. 20 Smith would probably support this outcome
since it eschewed the requirement for neutrality and secular
purpose; it supported the local community’s understanding of
religion and its history; and did not violate the Establishment
Clause’s prohibition on establishing or supporting a national
church.
The Court’s reasoning looks more like the soft
constitutionalism of the pre-Everson era.
Koppelman would not support the Town of Greece decision.
He might say that the nature of prayer itself and the sectarian
character of the prayers at issue in the case suggest that government
is declaring religious truth (prayer is good, Christianity is good), or
at the very least lending support for religious truth. In fact, he
argues that Town of Greece’s predecessor case, Marsh v. Chambers,
should be overruled as legislative prayer involved the government

19. Town of Greece, 134 S.Ct. at 1826.
20. Id. at 1832-33 (Alito, J., concurring).
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in making a continual set of discretionary religious choices. 21 As
government is deciding a live religious debate, and there is no
secular purpose, the principle of neutrality dictates the law to be
overturned. 22
The discussion above should not suggest there are no
weaknesses of Smith’s theory. As attractive as it is, it begs the
question of how the Court should return to soft constitutionalism.
Perhaps the answer is allowing the Court to continue its erratic
course of using different principles for each Establishment Clause
case it decides. This might seem to work, but a bit more formality
may be preferable if Smith’s theory is adopted. For instance, Smith
notes that in the pre-Everson adjudication, the Court decided cases
based on state law and avoided making declarations on what the
First Amendment meant. If the law is to return to that path, as Smith
advocates, would this require the Court to avoid making any
pronouncements on what the Constitution requires and instead
make decisions solely based on political morality? Further, would
it necessitate the de-incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment
from the First Amendment so that state law and local
understandings could be determinative? Or is the alternative even
starker—if the Court is to return to the jurisdictional argument, does
it need to abstain from all such cases entirely, so that it would not
agree to hear a case on legislative prayer or any other Establishment
Clause issue because it lacks the necessary competence? A little
more direction from Smith would be beneficial. Without any, it
would seem Smith’s theory is one where the Court gives deference
to the majority rule in which the religious understandings of a state
or community is shaped by those with the most political power. If
this is the case, then it is not clear that religious minorities will face
less oppression or feel any less alienated.
Perhaps it is a bit naïve for any American, at this point in the
nation’s history, to expect coherence and consistency in Supreme
Court adjudication. Both Koppelman and Smith demonstrate the
difficulty in building a coherent approach to the Establishment
Clause. The country is moving towards a heightened level of
religious pluralism as the number of people who do not affiliate
with religion increases, while at the same time the number of
monotheistic denominations and new religions grow as well. The
21. 463 U.S. 783 (1983); KOPPELMAN, supra note 4 at 76.
22. Id.
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ability to define what constitutes religion and who is a religious
believer becomes more difficult as time goes on. Maybe it is just
not possible to adopt one principle to be used for each and every
case and instead, the best the Court can do is make case-by-case
decisions based upon whatever principles seem most appropriate at
that particular time. In this sense, perhaps Smith is correct. If all
groups are losing, then all are winning. This is not exactly
satisfactory, but it may be the best that can be done. At least this
way, America’s first freedom is protected, even if the strength of
that protection may occasionally rise or fall.

